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ABSTRACT 
The question of political pluralism is an important one, given that liberal democracies must give 
it its due place without letting it tear apart the social fabric. One of the dominant theories within 
political philosophy on political pluralism is deliberative democratic theory, which advocates a 
rational consensus. By insisting on rational conditions for political argument and consensus, it 
believes that it is possible to both legitimize political power and ensure freedom and equality 
for all. Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism is a critical response to this rationalistic framework. She 
maintains that instead of enabling political pluralism, deliberative democracy precludes it. In 
her view, rationality is not some kind of objective parameter, but a hegemonic expression of 
power. Inspired by Schmitt, Wittgenstein and Derrida, Mouffe argues that political pluralism 
requires a conflictual consensus, one in which adversaries battle over the conceptions of the 
ethico-political principles of liberal democracy, i.e. freedom and equality. To see which 
framework can better accommodate political pluralism, I will be discussing both Mouffe’s 
critique of deliberative democratic theory and deliberative democratic theory’s critique of 
Mouffe. Although Mouffe (necessarily) cannot give a conclusive argument in favour of 
agonistic pluralism, her deliberative democratic critics do not succeed in dispelling it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Are political consensus and pluralism wholly compatible or fundamentally at odds with one 
another? It was John Rawls who put this question prominently on the political philosopher’s 
agenda, by basing his famous principles of justice on the notion of an ‘overlapping consensus’.1 
Rawls contended that all rational members of society would endorse these principles for 
governing the public sphere, apart from any private interests they may have. By grounding these 
principles in an overlapping consensus, however, the question arose how this consensus would 
then exactly come about. It is here where we encounter Habermas and Mouffe, the protagonists 
of this thesis.           
 The most elaborate political theory of consensus and political legitimacy is deliberative 
democracy, championed by Jürgen Habermas.2 Deliberative democratic theory revolves around 
the notion of rational deliberation: if the conditions under which rational citizens deliberate are 
rational (an “ideal speech situation”3), the outcome will be a rational consensus. While this 
rational consensus grants political legitimacy on the one hand, the same consensus can again 
always be challenged rationally on the other. Political legitimacy is not a given and needs to 
rationally account for itself, thus ensuring space for political pluralism: all can challenge the 
rational consensus on its procedures and political agenda on the same rational grounds. The 
                                                          
1 Rawls’s original expression of these principles can be found in A Theory of Justice (1974): “the first requires 
equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic 
inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits 
for everyone, and in particular for the least advantages members of society” (14/15). According to Rawls, 
rational citizens would choose these principles for governing society’s institutions in the ‘original position of 
equality’. In this original position, “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does 
anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like” 
(12). While Rawls first understood this original position to be a “purely hypothetical situation”, later in his career 
he situated it as an ‘overlapping consensus’, “a consensus in which it [a regulative political conception of justice] 
is affirmed by the opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over generations in a 
more or less just constitutional democracy, where the criterion of justice is that political conception itself” 
(Rawls 1974: 12, Rawls 1987: 1). 
2 The following outline of the central tenets of Habermassian deliberative democracy is based on Martí (2017). 
3 Extensively discussed by Habermas in “Wahrheitstheorien” (1973). In his more recent work, however, he talks 
about “pragmatic presuppositions”, highlighting their non-ideal character. See Zwischen Naturalismus und 
Religion (2005).  
  
  
   
only thing that cannot be challenged are the rational conditions themselves.4 It is precisely this 
preponderance of rationality that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism is a response to. In her view, 
Rawls and Habermas effectively silence pluralism under the veil of rationality (Mouffe 1999: 
745).           
 Instead of being an impartial parameter, Mouffe maintains that Rawls and Habermas’s 
notions of rationality are exclusionary and self-fulfilling, as they require political argument to 
be rational: Rawls and Habermas would equate rational with ‘liberal’ or ‘deliberative’, thus 
disqualifying all other political expressions as ‘irrational’. Instead of accommodating pluralism 
within a liberal democratic setup, their respective political theories would preclude it. Mouffe’s 
own political theory, agonistic pluralism, is intended as a pluralist alternative to liberal and 
deliberative democratic theory. According to Mouffe, we should accept that any kind of societal 
consensus is always political and necessarily a hegemonic expression of power. Although she 
thinks this rules out the possibility of achieving a fully inclusive political consensus, she does 
believe any kind of consensus within the bounds of liberal democracy should be contestable, 
even on a concept like rationality. Arguing against deliberative democratic theory, Mouffe 
maintains that political arguments following an established criterion constitute an unwarranted 
violation of pluralism. Given that there is no intellectual high ground to decide whether an 
utterance is rationally valid, in principle any contestation goes.     
 There have been numerous deliberative democratic responses to counter Mouffe’s 
critique, most notably from Eva Erman, John Dryzek and Andrew Knops.5 These critics have 
                                                          
4 For Habermas’s most thorough discussion of rationality, see The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1.: 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (1984). Habermas’s political theory is much more complex than I can 
possibly convey in these few sentences. For the purpose of this thesis, I will confine myself to those aspects of 
his political theory most relevant to Mouffe’s critique. A particularly clear and concise presentation of how 
deliberative democrats’ ideal speech conditions should be precisely envisaged, can be found in Seyla Benhabib’s 
Democracy and Difference (1996). In the next chapter, I will draw extensively on Benhabib, as Mouffe herself 
does too.    
5 See Erman, ‘What is wrong with agonistic pluralism?’ (2009); Dryzek, ‘Deliberative Democracy in Divided 
Societies’ (2005); Knops, ‘Agonism as Deliberation – On Mouffe’s Theory of Democracy’ (2007). 
  
  
   
not only tried to defend deliberative democratic theory, but have questioned the conceptual 
soundness of Mouffe’s own agonistic pluralism too. Their respective criticisms form the 
backbone of this thesis. By finding out whether Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism withstands the 
critique of her deliberative democratic opponents, I will try to find an answer to the question 
whether agonistic pluralism is truly a more pluralist alternative to deliberative democratic 
theory. Hence the main question of this thesis is as follows: 
Can agonistic pluralism better accommodate political pluralism than deliberative democratic 
theory? 
I will argue that it can, if we accept Mouffe’s conceptual dimension of ‘the political’ and the 
concomitant distinction between antagonism and agonism. If we agree with her that any societal 
consensus is political and that the principles of liberal democracy cannot be subjected to the 
criterion of rationality, then the kind of rational consensus proposed by the likes of Rawls and 
Habermas can indeed be said to threaten political pluralism. I will argue that whether we accept 
Mouffe’s conceptual distinctions, however, ultimately is a matter of conviction. Mouffe’s 
political theory is not a rational alternative to deliberative democratic theory in the deliberative 
democratic sense of the word; it is foremost an attempt to change our understanding of the 
nature of political pluralism itself.        
 In chapter 1, I will situate the debate between Habermassian ‘consensual’ deliberative 
democratic theory6 and Mouffe’s ‘emancipatory’ agonistic pluralism7 by giving an overview of 
the central tenets of both positions. The main question of the first chapter is whether the 
conceptions of pluralism offered by Habermas and Mouffe are incommensurable. If this proves 
to be the case, they might be difficult to compare. In chapter 2, however, we will see that Erman, 
                                                          
6 Martí (2017) spells out the difference between ‘consensual’ deliberative democrats on the one hand, and 
‘plural’ deliberative democrats on the other. Habermas falls within the former category. 
7 Emancipatory’ agonistic pluralism is a term coined by Fossen (2008), in order to distinguish Mouffe’s brand of 
agonistic pluralism from that of ‘perfectionist’ agonistic pluralism, most prominently advocated by Owen. See 
footnote 18. 
  
  
   
Dryzek and Knops have attempted to counter Mouffe’s agonistic critique or accommodate her 
agonistic pluralism within deliberative democratic theory. The central question of the second 
chapter is whether agonistic pluralism can be subsumed under deliberative democratic theory. 
Although we will see that all three point out conceptual difficulties for Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism, they do not succeed in subsuming her agonistic pluralism under deliberative 
democratic theory; rather, their challenges to the conceptual clarity and coherence of Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism constitute a serious test to her political theory. These will therefore be at the 
heart of chapter 3. The main question this chapter tries to answer is whether Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism can be considered conceptually coherent. By buttressing Mouffe’s distinction 
between agonism and antagonism and by understanding that her political commitments do not 
fundamentally compromise her political theory, we will see that it can.   
 As we will soon see, Mouffe’s pluralism ends up much closer to Habermas’s 
deliberative democratic position despite their initial seeming differences. Although agonistic 
pluralism makes some conceptual assumptions that deliberative democratic theory does not, 
both consider pluralism vital to a well-functioning liberal democracy. Mouffe mainly shifts the 
balance between consensus and pluralism. While Habermas and his followers underline the 
importance of a rational consensus within a pluralist society, Mouffe argues that any consensus 
is always exclusionary, supressing ‘difference’ and causing violations. Instead of conceiving 
modern liberal society as one that needs it, Mouffe suggests we would do better to think of 
political consensus as the outcome of an agonistic struggle over the conceptions of what she 
calls the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy. Only then would liberal democracy’s 
innate pluralist character be rightly honoured.
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CHAPTER I 
HABERMAS AND MOUFFE 
In this chapter, I will give an overview of the main points of contention between consensual 
deliberative democracy and emancipatory agonistic pluralism. First, I will discuss the central 
tenets of Habermassian deliberative democracy. Second, I will discuss Mouffe’s agonistic 
critique of its premises and goals. The central question of this chapter is as follows: are the 
conceptions of pluralism offered by deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism 
incommensurable with one another? Let us turn to Habermas and Mouffe now. 
 
1.1  CONSENSUALIST DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Consensualist deliberative democrats are sometimes called classic or traditional deliberative 
democrats (Martí 2017: 556). Like other deliberative democrats, they maintain that the 
“participants in deliberative processes should aim to rationally convince others about the 
rightness of their beliefs”, which is “the essence of deliberation: a free exchange of arguments 
to convince others on the basis of reason” (560). What sets consensual deliberative democrats 
like Habermas apart from plural deliberative democrats, however, is that they “praise the value 
of political consensus as the aim to which democratic deliberation should ideally aspire” (560). 
Hence the label ‘consensualist’. Martí even speaks of the conceptual necessity for these kind of 
deliberative democrats to reach a collective consensus, as the deliberative process continues 
until rational agreement is found (560). Politically, this amounts to the idea that an agreement 
is legitimate when “produced by an ideal process of democratic deliberation and unanimously 
agreed upon by free and equal citizens” (560). We should not take this to mean that the 
conditions for democratic deliberation should always be ideal for political decisions to be 
legitimate; instead, these conditions should be perceived as “a regulative ideal” (560). It is 
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important to notice that consensualist deliberative democracy accordingly “adopts a meta-
ethical, if minimal, commitment with some degree of objectivity”, since without any at least 
partially independent “standards of correctness supported by reasons”, it would be impossible 
to ascertain that the agreement reached through deliberation were rational (560). In the 
following, I want to clarify how deliberative democrats envisage the ideal process of democratic 
deliberation.           
 In Democracy and Difference, Seyla Benhabib, a prominent follower of Habermas, 
gives a clear and succinct impression of what an ideal process of democratic deliberation for 
deliberative democrats looks like: 
1.  Participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and        
symmetry; all have the same chance to initiate speech acts, to question, 
interrogate, and to open debate; 
2.  All have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; 
3.  All have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the 
discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out. There 
are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda or the conversation, nor the identity 
of the participants, as long as each excluded person or group can justifiably show 
that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question (Benhabib 
1996: 70). 
 
To understand the premises of this ideal process, we first need to grasp the central importance 
of legitimacy within deliberative democratic theory. For deliberative democrats, the legitimacy 
of political decisions comes from within, meaning that it comes from the free and equal 
individuals participating in the process of collective deliberation themselves (Martí 2017: 560). 
However, legitimacy is needed at a procedural level as well. The collective deliberation of the 
free and equal citizens can only be ascertained to be indeed legitimate, if the arguments put 
forward by them are legitimate, i.e. ‘rational’ and  ‘free’. This constitutes the heart of what 
Habermas calls ‘critical reflection’: free and rational political life is only possible on the basis 
of agreement, which itself needs to be free and rational again (Habermas 1984: 17; Tully 1989: 
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174). When we look at the ideal conditions for democratic deliberation put forward by 
Benhabib, we can see how these conditions revolve around political legitimacy. While 1) refers 
to the free and equal citizens, 2) and 3) are deliberative democratic elaborations of 1): 2) 
substantive and 3) procedural. Whereas 1) just states that all have the right to participate in 
deliberation in equal measure, 2) maintains that even if there is some consensus on the topics 
of conversation, this may be questioned again. Condition 3) goes a step further; it follows that 
the free and equal citizen may even question the legitimacy of the discourse procedure itself. 
While 2) empowers citizens to make substantial changes to the topics for deliberation, 3) allows 
them to question the way in which these topics are discussed at all. These ideal conditions thus 
ensure both political pluralism, by giving all free and equal citizens the chance to induce 
substantive and procedural change, as well as a rational consensus, by letting the “unforced 
force of the better argument” triumph (Habermas 1996: 306).   
 Although we have a better understanding of the ideal conditions of democratic 
deliberation now, it is still not clear what exactly qualifies as the better, more rational argument. 
Since they play such a fundamental role within the deliberative democratic model, this notion 
merits closer inspection. Habermas believes rationality to be inherent to speech in the form of 
validity claims.8 He gives a clear account of what he means by this in his seminal The Theory 
of Communicative Action. Habermas states that 
It belongs to the communicative intent of the speaker (a) that he perform [sic] a 
speech act that is right in respect to the given normative context, so that between 
him and the hearer an intersubjective relation will come about which is recognized 
as legitimate; (b) that he makes a true statement (or correct existential 
presuppositions), so that the hearer will accept and share the knowledge of the 
speaker; and (c) that he expresses truthfully his beliefs, intentions, feelings, 
desires, and the like, so that the hearer will give credence to what is said 
(Habermas 1986: 307, 308). 
 
                                                          
8 The following section is inspired by Tully (1989). 
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As we can infer from the citation above, a successful speech act needs to be right and true and 
the speaker has to express his or her beliefs truthfully. When we combine the ideal process of 
deliberative democratic deliberation with the validity claims for speech acts, the following 
picture emerges: deliberative democracy is about free and equal citizens deliberating under 
conditions in which all free and equal citizens can participate, question the agenda and ask for 
justifications for the discourse procedures. The arguments put forward within this deliberation 
are further to be evaluated by their fulfilment of validity claims, which Habermas sees as 
“satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action” (Habermas 
1984: 397). While we can appreciate the central tenets of the deliberative democratic model at 
this point, one important question has not yet been addressed: that of the value of consensus. 
From the idea that ideal conditions and the fulfilment of validity claims are prerequisites for a 
rational consensus, it still does not follow that such a consensus should be the aim of politics. 
Habermas, however, maintains that “the telos of reaching understanding is inherent in the 
concept of speech” (Habermas 1984: 287). In other words, reaching (an) agreement lies within 
language. The ideal speech conditions would, in that light, be an elaboration of a core rationality 
already present in speech. Martí further notes that “in the absence of disagreement, politics – 
and therefore, democracy and much less deliberative democracy – would be unnecessary” 
(Martí 2017: 559). By giving free and equal citizens the possibility to question the agenda and 
the discourse procedures, and by judging the weight of arguments on the basis of rational 
validity claims, deliberative democracy claims to be able to accommodate pluralism, legitimize 
power and direct liberal democracy towards agreement. If disagreement is the status quo, 
deliberative democracy offers us a model for reaching rational consensus.  
 The relative value of agreement and disagreement is of great interest for the discussion 
between deliberative democrats and pluralistic agonists. While the deliberative democrats’ 
consensus is informed by the need to arrive at political agreement and legitimacy 
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notwithstanding disagreement, Mouffe places disagreement in the form of ‘the political’ at the 
heart of her political theory. Instead of trying to cover up disagreement by envisaging politics 
as deliberative consensus, we should understand disagreement as the condition that makes 
liberal democracy possible at all. In the following section, I will first discuss Mouffe’s Schmitt-
based analysis of liberal democracy. Following this discussion, I will elaborate on the concept 
of ‘the political’, which is the conceptual underpinning of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism. Her 
analysis of liberal democracy and her Schmitt-inspired distinction between ‘the political’ and 
politics leads her to conclude that any kind of consensus is inherently ‘hegemonic’, which is 
contestable by nature due to its political character. We will see that the question of rationally 
grounded legitimacy lies at the heart of the debate between deliberative democracy and 
agonistic pluralism: can a political consensus be rendered rationally legitimate (as deliberative 
democrats maintain), or does it always represent some form of hegemonic power, legitimized 
simply because it ‘is’?  
 
1.2 MOUFFE’S CRITIQUE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
In order to properly grasp Mouffe’s critique of deliberative democracy, we have to start from 
her understanding of liberal democracy.9 Mouffe sees this form of political organisation as a 
“contingent historical articulation” of two traditions, i.e. the liberal and the democratic one 
(Mouffe 2000: 2, 3). She stresses that the values of individual liberty and human rights, which 
are two of the central tenets of the liberal tradition, “do not have their origin in the democratic 
discourse”, which she believes to be contrarily rooted in equality and popular sovereignty (2). 
                                                          
9 For a thorough analysis of the historical development of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, see Wenman, Agonistic 
Democracy: Constituent Power in the Era of Globalisation, especially Chapter 5: “Agonism and the problem of 
antagonism: Chantal Mouffe” (2013). For reasons of clarity and conciseness, I will confine myself mostly to 
Mouffe’s critique of deliberative democracy here and only flesh out those aspects of agonistic pluralism 
fundamental to understanding her deliberative democratic critique.   
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The fact that liberal democracy should be seen as the articulation of two distinct traditions has 
important implications for Mouffe, since she thinks it leads to a paradox. While “the very 
legitimacy of liberal democracy is based on the idea of popular sovereignty”, liberal democracy 
always puts limits on the exercise of the sovereignty of the people (4). According to Mouffe, 
“the idea that it is legitimate to establish limits to popular sovereignty in the name of liberty” 
cannot itself be contested within a liberal democracy (4). She further maintains that the two 
traditions out of which liberal democracy has emanated are ultimately incompatible and 
irreconcilable (5). By not acknowledging this tension at the heart of liberal democracy, 
“‘deliberative democracy’ […] is unable to grasp the dynamics of modern democratic politics 
which lies in the confrontation between the two components of the liberal democratic 
articulation” (8). Instead of searching for an unattainable rational consensus, modern 
democratic politics should strive for an “’agonistic confrontation’ between conflicting 
interpretations of the constitutive liberal democratic values” (9). It is here where her agonistic 
pluralism takes off.           
 The conceptual framework informing Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism stems from Carl 
Schmitt, whose political theory revolved around ‘the political’ and the ‘friend/enemy 
distinction’. Schmitt held that liberalism cannot properly grasp ‘the political’, which “can only 
be understood in the context of the friend/enemy grouping” (Schmitt 1996: 26; Mouffe 2005: 
11). Mouffe paraphrases Schmitt when she writes ‘the political’ is about the formation of a ‘we’ 
in opposition to a ‘they’ and “always concerned with collective forms of identification” (11). 
Since liberal thought is ultimately concerned with the individual, it accordingly cannot grasp 
“the nature of collective identities” (11). Although Schmitt himself thought that this conceptual 
incommensurability precluded the possibility of liberal democracy altogether, conversely 
Mouffe contends that it is precisely through ‘the political’ and the friend/enemy distinction that 
the merits of liberal democracy become clear (Mouffe 2000: 11). The liberal discourse of 
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human rights for example constantly challenges “the relations of inclusion-exclusion implied 
by the political constitution of ‘the people’”, while “it is only thanks to the democratic logics 
of equivalence that frontiers can be created and a demos established without which no real 
exercise of rights could be possible” (10). Although her use of the concept of ‘the political’ thus 
originates from Schmitt, understanding Mouffe’s liberal democratic reworking of it is 
fundamental to evaluating her proposed agonistic pluralism.    
 In The Democratic Paradox, Mouffe stresses that we should make a distinction between 
‘the political’ and ‘politics’. Still following Schmitt, she writes that 
By ‘the political’ I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human 
relations, antagonisms that can take many forms and emerge in different types of 
social relations. ‘Politics’, on the other side, indicates the ensemble of practices, 
discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize 
human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because 
they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political’ (101). 
 
While ‘the political’ denotes an ineradicable antagonistic dimension inherent in human 
relations, Mouffe understands ‘politics’ as the political organization of society. The reason why 
it is so important for her to make such a distinction is that she wants to argue that antagonism 
is ineradicably part of a democratic set-up. Antagonism is however a kind of friend/enemy 
distinction that, although necessary for collective identity formation, undermines the 
functioning of liberal democracy (13). It is here that Mouffe deviates from Schmitt. Mouffe 
contends that instead of antagonism, the friend/enemy opposition can also manifest itself within 
liberal democracy as ‘agonism’, a relation not between enemies but between adversaries 
(Mouffe 1999: 755). Mouffe sees this category of the adversary as instrumental to modern 
pluralist democratic politics and places it at the very centre of her understanding of liberal 
democracy as agonistic pluralism (Mouffe 2000: 14). Although antagonism is both ineradicable 
from and detrimental to liberal democracy, it becomes compatible with it in the form of 
agonism. Agonistic adversaries are bound together by their adherence to “the ethico-political 
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principles of democracy”, but can contest the way in which these principles get their political 
form (Mouffe 1999: 755). Mouffe moreover stresses that disagreement about the meaning and 
the implementation of these principles cannot be settled “through deliberation and rational 
discussion”, hence antagonism will always remain part of the adversarial relation (755). 
Consequently, consensus is not the rational outcome of ideal deliberation, but the political 
outcome of a never-ending power struggle between political adversaries: “since [the] ethico-
political principles can only exist through many different and conflicting interpretations, [...] a 
consensus is bound to be a ‘conflictual consensus’” (756). For Mouffe, any political consensus 
is always the expression of power of a certain hegemony.     
 To start with, Mouffe believes that any “social objectivity is constituted through acts of 
power” (752). This has important ramifications, since it implies that “any social objectivity is 
ultimately political and that it has to show the traces of exclusion that governs its constitution” 
(752). To clarify what she means by this, she refers to Derrida’s ‘constitutive outside’: 
Because every object has inscribed in its very being something other than itself 
and, as a result, everything is constructed as ‘difference’, its being cannot be 
conceived as pure ‘presence’ or pure ‘objectivity’. Since the constitutive outside 
is present within the inside, as its always real possibility, every identity becomes 
purely contingent (Mouffe 1994: 1536). 
 
Given the presence of the constitutive outside, it is impossible to establish conditions in which 
agreement between citizens would be free and rational, since those conditions would always be 
established through power and exclusion. In other words, there is no objective ‘objectivity’; all 
identities are based on contingent power relations. Mouffe calls this convergence (“or rather 
mutual collapse”) between objectivity and power hegemony (Mouffe 1999:752, 753). The 
concept of hegemony directly touches upon the relative merit of consensus and it is important 
to understand her here. Mouffe is not against political consensus per se, but believes a political 
consensus “not […] based on any form of exclusion” to be conceptually impossible, since it is 
necessarily “the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations” (Mouffe 
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2000: 32, 49). As “the frontier that it [the political consensus] establishes between what is and 
what is not legitimate is a political one, […] it should remain contestable” (49). Accordingly, 
Mouffe does not see an “unbridgeable gap between power and legitimacy” (Mouffe 1999: 753). 
Within her theoretical framework, political legitimacy cannot be grounded on rational 
agreement, nor needs it to be. The hegemonic consensus simply defines what is politically 
legitimate. Since any social objectivity is always political, however, this consensus is by 
definition contestable. In contrast, she believes the deliberative rational consensus to be a 
depoliticisation of its innately political character. By presenting rational procedural agreement 
as the political ideal, deliberative democrats are actually proposing “to find procedures to deal 
with differences whose objective is actually to make those differences irrelevant and to relegate 
pluralism to the sphere of the private” (Mouffe 2000: 19). In order to fully grasp Mouffe’s 
critique on deliberative democratic theory’s notion of rationality, we need to turn to 
Wittgenstein.           
 According to Mouffe, “one of the most contentious issues among political theorists in 
recent years” is whether “liberal democracy should be envisaged as the rational solution to the 
political question of how to organize human coexistence” (Mouffe 2000: 62). Mouffe believes 
this question to be at the heart between ‘rational-universalists’, like the early Rawls and 
Habermas, and contextualists, like herself. While the former supposedly argue that “the aim of 
political theory is to establish universal truths, valid for all independently of the historico-
cultural context”, the latter “deny the availability of a point of view that could be situated 
outside the practices and the institutions of a given culture and from where universal, ‘context-
independent’ judgements could be made” (63). Following Mouffe, Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
of language shows that concepts cannot possibly have a single determined referent for all users. 
There are two Wittgensteinian concepts of particular importance to her: ‘language games’ and 
‘forms of life’. Against Rawls and Habermas, Mouffe argues that liberal democratic institutions 
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“must be seen as defining one possible ‘language game’ among others” (64). According to 
Mouffe, they are hence always context-dependent and do not embody the rational solution to 
human coexistence, which makes it impossible to ground them on universal rationality (64). 
The fact that the meaning of a concept like rationality is always part of a language game 
moreover precludes the possibility of finding a universally valid rational justification for liberal 
democracy itself. Following Mouffe, “liberal democratic principles can only be defended as 
being constitutive of our form of life […]” (65).      
 In addition to showing that neither liberal democratic institutions nor its principles can 
be justified with reference to some sort of universal rationality, Mouffe thinks Wittgenstein’s 
concepts of ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’ serve to criticize deliberative democracy’s 
distinction between practice and procedure too. Mouffe refers to §241 of the Philosophical 
Investigations when she writes that there need to be many (tacit) “‘agreements in judgements’ 
in a society before a given set of procedures can work” (68). Since these agreements in 
judgments are grounded in practices, this would show that “procedures only exist as complex 
ensembles of practices” (68). Mouffe accordingly believes that the very possibility of allegiance 
to certain procedures hinges on practices, which constitute certain forms of identity and 
individuality (68). The upshot of her Wittgensteinian discussion of the relation between practice 
and procedure is that there cannot be a clear separation between procedural and substantial: 
procedures presuppose substantial commitments to certain practices, “the acceptance of certain 
values” (68). Given the importance of identity and practice for our allegiance to procedures, 
Mouffe concludes that “procedures involve substantial ethical commitments” (69). Democratic 
procedures are thus not sustained by rationality and deliberation, but through “identification 
with democratic values” (70).        
 Based on her discussion of ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’, Mouffe furthermore 
contends that there is no one best, ‘rational’ way to play the democratic game. Instead, we 
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should foster “a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and [create] institutions that 
would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways” (73). Linking her 
discussion of Wittgenstein with her notions of ‘the political’ and the antagonism/agonism 
distinction, Mouffe states that 
Democratic citizenship can take many forms and such a diversity, far from being 
a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will, of 
course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different 
understandings to coexist without clashing. But this struggle will not be one 
between ‘enemies’ but among ‘adversaries’, since all participants will recognize 
the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding 
of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call ‘agonistic pluralism’, is 
unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic [sic] which, by necessity, tends to 
erase diversity (73). 
 
By problematizing the universalist notion of rationality and positing agreement in form of life 
before agreement in opinion, Wittgenstein thus provides Mouffe with a conceptual apparatus 
to criticize both deliberative democracy’s core concept of rationality and develop her own 
political theory of agonistic pluralism.       
 In summary, we have seen that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism hinges on the notion of 
‘the political’ and its friend/enemy distinction, which Mouffe considers essential to the 
formation of collective identities and ineradicably ‘present’. By turning antagonism into 
agonism, the conflict at the heart of liberal democracy can however be rendered democratically 
productive. Given that all social objectivities are power laden, it is furthermore unwarranted 
and impossible to use rationality as a criterion for consensus. Based on Derrida’s notion of the 
constitutive outside, Mouffe redefines the link between rationality and impartiality: rationality 
is not an impartial parameter for judging speech acts, but an expression of identity-forming 
contingent power. Moreover, with the use of a conceptual apparatus provided by Wittgenstein, 
Mouffe argues that the whole deliberative democratic undertaking of trying to ground liberal 
democracy’s institutions, principles and procedures ‘rationally’, is doomed to fail. Since 
rationality would always be context dependent and defined by the (irrational) practices in which 
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it is grounded, she believes it impossible to establish rational procedures; instead, in order for 
liberal democracy to flourish we should concentrate on the citizens’ democratic ethos. The 
prime task of democratic politics is consequently not the creation of a rational consensus, but 
“to mobilise […] passions towards the promotion of democratic designs”, for which collective 
identification plays a key role (Mouffe 1999: 755, 756).   
 
1.3 PLURALISM BETWEEN DELIBERATION AND AGONISM 
At this point, we should return to our discussion of the central tenets of consensual deliberative 
democracy, as we now have Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism’s critique in full view. Consensualist 
deliberative democracy emphasized the possibility of rational consensus based on the inherent 
rationality within speech. The ideal speech conditions can be seen as an extension of this 
inherent rationality, which ensures that the consensus reached under these conditions is a 
rational one. That the political consensus reached is rational is so important to deliberative 
democrats, as political legitimacy rests on democratic deliberation, which can only be 
ascertained rationally (Habermas 2011: 24). Free and equal citizens can moreover both 
substantively and procedurally question the deliberation, which, in addition to the innate 
rationality of speech, legitimizes the reached agreement and renders the consensus rational. 
Within Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, on the other hand, disagreement is ineradicably present 
as ‘the political’. Mouffe sees ‘antagonism’ as fundamental to understanding collective 
identities, while at the same time acknowledging that it endangers the proper workings of liberal 
democracy. In her view, liberal democracy should hence be directed towards rendering the 
antagonistic dimension of ‘the political’ democratically productive by turning antagonism into 
agonism, with adversaries who acknowledge each other as legitimate political opponents. For 
Mouffe, the central issue of liberal democracy is accordingly not to reach (hegemonic) 
consensus, but to create democratic individuals by fostering “identification with democratic 
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values” (Mouffe 2000: 96).          
 Although Habermas’s consensualist deliberative democracy and Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism are contrasting theoretical frameworks, pluralism plays a fundamental role in both; 
deliberative democracy’s ‘ideal deliberative conditions’ are a reply to ‘the fact of pluralism’10, 
while within Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism it is an emancipatory force for questioning divisions 
of inclusion/exclusion. Although Mouffe does not elaborate much on it, it seems that she does 
not value political pluralism in itself. When she explains how her political theory differs from 
extreme pluralism, she is explicit about her ethical commitments: “I consider that, despite its 
claim to be more democratic, such a perspective prevents us from recognizing how certain 
differences are constructed as relations of subordination and should therefore be challenged by 
a radical democratic politics” (20). That is the reason why Mouffe places such emphasis on the 
fact that agonists subscribe to the ethico-political principles of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’. Both 
deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism thus explicitly endorse the same liberal 
democratic value of pluralism, but differ in their respective valuations of its relation to 
‘conflict’.            
 For Mouffe, political pluralism within deliberative democratic theory’s ideal speech 
conditions is conceptually impossible:  
By postulating the possibility of [a] public sphere where power and antagonism 
would have been eliminated and where a rational consensus would have been 
realized, this model [deliberative democracy] of democratic politics denies the 
central role in politics of the conflictual dimension and its crucial role in the 
formation of collective identities (Mouffe 1999: 752).   
 
Since any social objectivity is an expression of power, claiming a rational consensus to be the 
aim of democratic politics effectively amounts to precluding pluralism. As Mouffe does not 
believe in innate rationality within speech, what is perceived to be rational would always be the 
                                                          
10 Notion coined by Rawls in “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” (1987), pp. 1.  
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expression of a certain hegemonic power. Rational consensus conceals the fact that such a 
consensus is always political: “it establishes what is and what is not [politically] legitimate […] 
and for that reason it should remain contestable” (Mouffe 2000: 49). By branding it as rational, 
we “naturalize what should be perceived as a contingent and temporary hegemonic articulation 
of ‘the people’ through a particular regime of inclusion-exclusion” (49). Mouffe wants to 
convince us that any consensus is always a political choice, with political ramifications. Only 
by realizing that inclusion/exclusion in the form of ‘the political’ lies at the heart of human 
relations can we address relations of subordination inherent to any consensus.  
 In response to Mouffe’s critique, deliberative democrats have generally pursued one of 
the following strategies: either they question the validity of Mouffe’s premises, i.e. ‘the 
political’ and its concomitant friend/enemy distinction, or they claim to be able to accommodate 
Mouffe’s pluralistic worries within a deliberative democratic framework. Habermas himself 
has pursued the first path. Although he has not (yet) directly responded to Mouffe, in The 
Political: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology he has 
however addressed Schmitt’s notion of ‘the political’. Habermas seems to think this concept 
can be appropriated by deliberative democratic theory in an updated version relevant to modern 
democracy by asking why “the political [shouldn’t] find an impersonal embodiment in the 
normative dimension of a democratic constitution” (Habermas 2011: 21). After an exegesis of 
its religious roots, he argues that even if we accept a secularized version of ‘the political’, liberal 
democratic political power always requires democratic legitimacy, the only kind of political 
legitimacy being left in the modern world (24). Habermas believes he has thus rebuked the 
challenge of ‘the political’: if state power requires democratic legitimacy, deliberative 
democracy points the way (24).         
 Mouffe would certainly disagree. Since she believes ‘the political’ to be ineradicably 
part of human relations, it would not make sense to her to think of it as finding ‘an impersonal 
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embodiment’ within a democratic constitution. It seems that we have reached an impasse here. 
Whether we find Mouffe’s notion of ‘the political’ convincing seems to be decided by our 
political inclinations, as she does not give many ‘rational’11 reasons to accept her view. Nor can 
she, as this would be self-defeating: if ‘the political’ were defendable by a deliberative 
democratic kind of rational argument, it could be wholly incorporated within deliberative 
democratic theory. Since Mouffe’s notion of pluralism is moreover defined by her particular 
analysis of ‘the political’, it seems that Habermas’s and Mouffe’s views on pluralism are 
ultimately incommensurable. Deliberative democrats other than Habermas have nonetheless 
tried to criticize Mouffe’s most fundamental theoretical assumptions deliberatively. By pointing 
out incongruities within her premises and by underlining the overlap between the political goals 
of deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism, Erman, Dryzek and Knops have sought 
different ways in which to discredit agonistic pluralism or subsume it under deliberative 
democratic theory. Whether they have succeeded in doing so, will be the central question of the 
next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 In the deliberative democratic sense of the word as presented in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUES 
In this chapter, I will be discussing the deliberative democratic criticisms of Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism by Erman, Dryzek and Knops. As these three authors offer different kinds of 
criticisms of agonistic pluralism, I will discuss them separately. By understanding how 
deliberative democrats have criticized Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism and by evaluating the 
strength of their critique, we will get a better view of what is at stake within the 
deliberation/agonism debate. Each subchapter will have the same outline: first, I will discuss 
the author’s criticism of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, after which I will give a response from 
Mouffe’s agonistic point of view. The central question of this chapter is as follows: can 
agonistic pluralism be subsumed under deliberative democratic theory? 
 
2.1  NO CONFLICT IN AGONISTIC PLURALISM: EVA ERMAN 
In ‘What is wrong with agonistic pluralism?’ Erman takes aim at Mouffe’s idea that ethical 
disagreements are in principle irreconcilable (Erman 2009: 1040). She believes this idée fixe to 
have important repercussions for what democratic institutions are desirable: 
If ethical conflicts can never be eradicated they must be dealt with through certain 
kinds of devised institutional arrangements. If they are not irreconcilable, we 
should bet on institutions that implement mechanisms and procedures for 
promoting cross-cultural dialogue and interethical understanding (1040). 
 
According to Erman, in order to know whether ethical disagreements are really in principle 
irreconcilable, we would have to investigate “the notion of conflict in democratic theory” 
(1040). It is Erman’s intention to show that “deliberation is constitutive of conflict, where 
deliberation is defined as speech-acts oriented performatively towards validity-claims” (1041). 
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This has important implications for Mouffe’s notion of antagonism, which Erman believes to 
become untenable, “because it does not embrace the idea that deliberation is constitutive of 
conflict” (1045). In order to show how Mouffe’s antagonism precludes consensus, Erman hones 
in on Mouffe’s Lacan-inspired notion of a ‘common symbolic space’, which for Mouffe denotes 
the difference between antagonism and agonism: antagonists purportedly do not share such a 
common symbolic space, while agonists do, as ‘friendly enemies’ who argue over its 
organization (Mouffe 2000: 13). Erman notes, however, that conflict presupposes common 
presumptions: “[S]ome kind of consensus is […] needed to even understand this ‘against’” 
(1046). Since conflict “is dependent on some shared idea of what is at stake”, this requires 
antagonists to share some sort of common symbolic space too. Erman subsequently equates this 
common symbolic space with deliberation, “speech-acts oriented performatively towards 
validity claims” (1047).          
 In other words, it is impossible to speak of conflict without presupposing a shared 
understanding of what the conflict is about. Mouffe’s notion of ineradicable antagonistic 
conflict can for Erman only be coherent if there is already some kind of understanding between 
the different parties, which comes about deliberately. Concerning the manner in which 
antagonism turns into agonism, Erman further wonders whether Mouffe’s distinction between 
antagonism and agonism holds. If some common symbolic framework is presupposed all along, 
it seems impossible to know when antagonism turns into agonism (1048). Erman concludes that 
agonistic pluralism requires a common symbolic framework not just “to identify antagonism as 
such, but also to be able to become adversaries (i.e. legitimate enemies) and to know what it 
means to comply with some ethico-political principles” (1048, 1049). She contends that Mouffe 
however seems to suggest that “the transformation from antagonism to agonism is a moral 
choice that can be neither explained nor grounded” and that the ethico-political principles 
agonists have to adhere to are to be reached through introspection (1049). Erman believes that 
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Mouffe holds that agonistic conflicts are interpersonal, while the intrapersonal structure for 
moral choices were already there (1049). Against such a Kantian view of autonomy and 
conflict, Erman points to deliberation.        
 Since deliberative democratic theory acknowledges “that human interaction involves 
both an interpersonal and intrapersonal dimension”, we cannot presuppose that identity is a 
premise of agency (1050). Instead, we should think of identity as an offspring of agency, which 
“is something that must be achieved through deliberation” (1050). Erman proceeds by defining 
what she means by agency; she thinks that it is not only “an exercise of (interpersonal) self-
determination, but at the same time a cognitive exercise of (intrapersonal) self-interpretation” 
(1050). She links this deliberative view on agency directly to conflict. From a deliberative 
democratic point of view, it does not make sense to claim that a conflict is ineradicable, as we 
could not know beforehand what possible conflicts may arise (1050). We do know how 
conflicts come about, however, i.e. deliberatively: “through an interplay between an 
interpersonal and interpersonal dimension, conflicts (within and between people) both emerge 
and transform” (1051). Conflicts between adversaries should thus not be seen as fixed, but as 
transformative and ever changing. What they presuppose is a shared understanding. Here the 
Habermassian validity claims come in. What is needed for a shared understanding is a shared 
acquaintance of the reasons for the validity of an utterance (1051). In order to understand those 
reasons, we have to be able to evaluate their validity. It is in this sense that Habermas’s 
communicative action “demands interpretations that are rational”, according to Erman (1052). 
She maintains that Habermas henceforth gives a pragmatic account of rationality, and not a 
metaphysical one, as Mouffe contends.   
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2.11  AGONISTIC RESPONSE 
If Erman is right in maintaining that conflict presupposes consensus, this seems to pose a real 
problem to Mouffe’s conceptual framework, as her analysis of conflict and consensus and her 
antagonism/agonism distinction would become untenable. There is, however, a problem with 
Erman’s argumentation, which has to do with the fact that she does not make distinctions 
between different types of consensus. Erman rightly believes that poststructuralists like Mouffe 
claim that ethical conflicts are by nature irreconcilable, but wrongly infers from this view that 
Mouffe “regards social consensus as a dangerously utopian idea” (1040). This is not what 
Mouffe is claiming. In order to understand Mouffe’s criticism of consensus, we have to make 
a distinction between political consensus and consensus per se. Mouffe does not need to reject 
Erman’s thesis that consensus is needed for conflict, just that a political consensus would be 
the outcome of a rational consensus. It is Mouffe herself, nevertheless, who engenders this 
confusion. By suggesting that antagonists do not share a common symbolic space, she seems 
to be suggesting that there is no consensus possible between them. What is lacking in her 
qualification of a common symbolic space is the political: antagonists do not share a common 
political symbolic space. What sets antagonists apart from agonists, is that agonists hold 
completely different political values, which may go against the ethico-political principles of 
liberal democracy. While Erman believes that Mouffe cannot intend this, a conflict between 
antagonists may indeed turn violent (as in a civil war for example), while an agonistic one 
always presupposes mutual respect for the other as an adversary and adherence to shared ethico-
political principles. For antagonism to turn into agonism, the different parties involved need to 
at least agree on the importance of those ethico-political principles. In other words, agonistic 
pluralism does presuppose consensus, just like deliberative democratic theory.   
 The problem of consensus rears its head again, however, when scrutinizing those ethico-
political principles. Erman points out that Mouffe is vague on “the contents of these normative 
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principles, although she specifies equality and liberty as important ingredients” (1044). Since 
these normative principles are so important for her antagonism/agonism distinction, it seems 
reasonable to ask Mouffe to be more specific on how she precisely envisages them. This is of 
course exactly what she does not want to do: Mouffe wants to keep these principles as general 
and vague as she can, in order to let her agonists do all the substantive work. Moreover, it not 
only unclear what these principles should look like, but how consensus is reached on them too. 
At first glance, Mouffe seems to maintain that consensus is needed on these principles, without 
explaining how antagonists come to adopt them. Deliberative democratic theory appears to be 
much better equipped to explain such common ground. Erman, for example, goes to great 
lengths to argue that identity is shaped interpersonally and intrapersonally and that political 
consensus can only be thought of as emanating from deliberative processes. Mouffe, however, 
grounds consensus along different lines. Instead of pointing to deliberative practices, she 
stresses the importance of political identification through collective passions. She believes that 
we ultimately do not become liberal democrats because of rational argument, but because we 
identify as such (Mouffe 2000: 96). Consensus on the ethico-political principles should 
accordingly not be envisaged as the outcome of some rational argument, but as a ‘passionate 
identification’ with those principles. Moreover, Mouffe does not just think collective passions 
and collective identification are needed for subjects to become democratic, but also essential to 
a liberal democracy: 
A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political 
positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation 
will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, 
as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the 
refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. 
Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around 
issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of 
antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility (Mouffe 2000: 104). 
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Following Mouffe, the consensus needed at the heart of liberal democracy should be based on 
collective passions and collective identifications, lest democracy turns into an apolitical 
confrontation between antagonisms. While Erman believes that consensus can only be reached 
on the basis of deliberative practices, Mouffe argues precisely the opposite. By eliminating 
“passions from the sphere of the public”, deliberative democrats actually endanger the 
democratic functioning they are purported to bolster with their deliberative practices (103).  
 In summary, we can now see that both deliberative democrats and agonistic pluralism 
presuppose consensus. Erman’s critique that Mouffe is radically against consensus is thus 
unwarranted. We should make a distinction between two types of consensus within agonistic 
pluralism however: consensus on the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy and 
consensus on the meaning of those principles. While the first consists of agreement on the 
ethico-political principles of liberal democracy through collective passions and collective 
identification, the second is always necessarily hegemonic for Mouffe, in which a certain 
conception of these principles is dominant. By making a clear distinction between a concept 
and its conception, Rawls offers us a conceptual framework to understand the different kinds 
of consensus Mouffe refers to: while agonists have to agree on the importance of the concepts 
of liberty and equality, the conception of these concepts is always the outcome of a political 
power struggle, which results in a certain hegemonic conception of the concept.12 Instead of 
pointing to a so-called telos or reaching understanding inherent in speech, as Habermas and 
Erman do, Mouffe seems to believe that consensus on the ethico-political principles is attainable 
through passionate collective identification. This assertion, however, begs the question of how 
passionate identification exactly leads to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy. 
This question will have to wait until the next chapter. For now, the upshot of our discussion of 
Erman’s critique on Mouffe is that Mouffe actually does accord an important role to consensus 
                                                          
12 A Theory of Justice (1971), pp. 5/6. Rawls himself would not use the qualification ‘hegemonic’; this is 
Mouffe’s addition. 
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within agonistic pluralism and that her reference to identification superficially explains how 
this consensus comes about.  
 
2.2  DRYZEK AND DEEP DEMOCRACY 
In order to get a clear idea of Dryzek’s critique of Mouffe and his deliberative alternative, I will 
draw on Dryzek’s article ‘Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to 
Agonism and Analgesia’, in which he directly targets Mouffe. Dryzek wants to argue against 
agonistic pluralism in general, but against Mouffe in particular “because she explicitly 
advocates agonism against deliberative democracy in plural societies” (Dryzek 2005: 220). 
Against agonistic pluralism, he argues for what he calls “a discursive democracy that can handle 
deep difference” (220). With deep difference, he refers to “deep moral disagreements”, the ones 
that Mouffe says cannot be resolved through deliberation, “committed as it is to rationalistic 
denial of passion and the pursuit of consensus that in practice both masks and serves power” 
(220). Dryzek agrees with Mouffe on the idea that turning antagonism into agonism is the 
central issue for democratic politics in divided societies, but says he disagrees with her agonistic 
theory on three different grounds (221). First of all, he criticizes Mouffe’s proposed “content 
of critical interchange”, which he describes as “energized by core identities”, without which 
passion would be lacking (221). For Dryzek, this is however contradictory to the idea that 
identities have to be fluid as to make a thorough conversion from antagonism to agonism 
possible (221). Second, he thinks Mouffe is mistaken to conceptualize deliberation 
dispassionately. Dryzek believes it to be possible “to formulate an account of discursive 
democracy that is more contestatory than this image, so more robust in the face of deep 
difference” (221). Third, he challenges Mouffe’s critique of consensus. He thinks that Mouffe 
“scorns consensus as a cover for power”, while consensus is needed in order to make decisions 
(221). Against Mouffe, Dryzek maintains that we have to differentiate between “the ways 
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politics can be conducted in different sites” (221). At some sites this might be done 
agonistically, but this need not be the case for all political sites.    
 In contrast to Mouffe, Dryzek believes that “[d]eliberative democracy can process 
contentious issues in a politics of engagement in the public sphere, even if it has problems doing 
so when it comes to deliberation within the institutions of the state” (223). In order to support 
this claim, he invokes the notion of ‘discourse’. According to Dryzek, “[A] discourse can be 
understood as a shared way of making sense of the world embedded in language” (223). For 
him, this means that “any given discourse will be defined by assumptions, judgments, 
contentions, dispositions, and capabilities, which enables “subscribers to a given discourse to 
recognize and convert sensory inputs into coherent accounts of situations” (223). Subsequently, 
“these accounts can then be shared in an intersubjectively meaningful fashion” (223). As 
examples of such discourses, he lists ‘market liberalism’ and ‘sustainable development’. He 
puts so much emphasis on these discourses because he believes that the “[T]he content of 
collective decisions depends strongly (but not exclusively) on the relative weight of competing 
discourses in a domain” (223). From the above, we can infer that Dryzek has a different notion 
of discourse than Foucault. He believes them to be less totalizing and constraining, as these 
discourses can be said to be democratic “to the degree they are under dispersed influence of 
competent actors, as opposed to manipulation by propagandists, spin doctors, and corporate 
advisers” (224). Furthermore, he thinks that “discourses must be amenable to reflection” and 
that the required communication in doing so “is deliberation not agonism because it is oriented 
to persuasion rather than conversion, and it retains some connection (however loose) to 
collective decision” (224).         
 Against Mouffe’s portrayal of deliberation, Dryzek maintains that “the engagement of 
discourses can accommodate many kinds of communication beyond reasoned argument, 
including rhetoric, testimony, performance, gossip, and jokes” (224). He adds, however, that 
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communication must fulfil three separate conditions in order to enable intersubjective 
understanding, which are very much reminiscent of the Habermassian validity claims. First of 
all, communication has to be capable of inducing reflection. As we have seen in the above, 
discourses are malleable through reflection for Dryzek. Communication accordingly has to 
cater to such reflection. Second, it has to be non-coercive. Although he does not explicitly name 
them, Dryzek seems to allude to the ‘free and equal’ citizens here. He appears to be claiming 
that intersubjective understanding is only possible when subjects understand one another on 
non-coercive grounds. Third, Dryzek thinks that communication has to be “capable of linking 
the particular experience of an individual or group with some general point or principle” (224). 
He believes this third requirement to be of particular importance concerning identity politics. 
He holds that “[i]dentities are bound up with discourses” and that the central question of 
democratic politics is how “reflective engagement across discourses” can construct 
relationships between different groups in society (225).  
 
2.22  AGONISTIC RESPONSE 
Before discussing Dryzek’s notion of discourse and his communicative conditions for 
intersubjective understanding, I will address the different criticisms he levels at Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism first. As we have seen, Dryzek believes Mouffe’s critical interchange “to 
be energized by core identities”, without which passion would be missing. Dryzek is however 
misrepresenting Mouffe here. She does not endorse (collective) passions per se, but deems a 
passionate identification with the principles of the ethico-political principles of liberal 
democracy to be necessary for it to flourish at all. The denominator of ‘core identities’ is 
furthermore a misnomer for the way in which Mouffe thinks of identity formation. Identities 
for Mouffe precisely do not contain some kind of core, but are purely contingent, as we have 
seen in the first chapter. Instead of being static, identities are malleable by nature. When the 
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rapport changes between two different groups, their identities change accordingly. This is 
precisely what happens when antagonism turns into agonism. What this agonistic identity 
precisely entails, is up for political contestation however. That is why Mouffe is so wary of 
political consensus. She does not “scorn consensus as a cover for power”, as Dryzek maintains, 
but simply believes that any political consensus is always the expression of a hegemonic power. 
This does not mean that Mouffe believes there should be no consensus, quite the contrary. Since 
no consensus on the conception of the ethico-political principles can be fully inclusionary, 
however, she stresses the importance of being able to contest any kind of consensus, including 
deliberative democracy’s ideal speech conditions and validity claims.   
 Dryzek’s most important critique of pluralistic agonism lies however with ‘deep 
difference’. If Dryzek is right that deliberative democracy can deal with divisive issues, such 
as profound ethical differences, this would undermine Mouffe’s agonistic critique of 
deliberative democracy and diminish its allure significantly. Yet, when carefully analysing 
Dryzek’s position, it shows that his deliberative democratic model simply leads to a deliberative 
kind of pluralism, which might render differences democratically productive, but does not 
explain how it processes deep difference, for which Mouffe precisely criticizes it.13 Returning 
to Dryzek’s ‘competing discourses’, we see that the examples Dryzek gives in order to describe 
what he means by discourse are ‘market liberalism’ and ‘sustainable development’, of which 
the former can said to be divisive, but the latter certainly not. They are in any case clearly not 
deep regarding the conception of the central tenets of liberal democracy, which is agonistic 
pluralism’s focal point. By further claiming that the “provisional outcomes” of competing 
discourses can said to be democratic to the extent “they are under dispersed influence of 
competent actors”, he reiterates a deliberative view on pluralism: discourses may run rampant 
                                                          
13 Mouffe thinks that the “main forms of liberal pluralism” suppress difference with their insistence on rationality 
and deliberation: “[it] proceeds to find procedures to deal with differences the object of which is actually to 
make those differences irrelevant […]” (Mouffe 1995: 1535).  
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as long as they are democratically kept in check by these competent actors, although it remains 
vague in what way these actors would exactly have to be competent (224). He further does not 
explain why these competent actors precisely render the provisional outcome of discourse 
struggles democratically legitimate. The same goes for the three criteria he mentions for 
securing intersubjective understanding. It is unclear why precisely these three criteria form a 
prerequisite to such understanding. Reflection-inducing communication in any case does not 
seem an obvious requirement. A similar vagueness surrounds the criteria of non-coerciveness 
and the capability of linking the individual experience to that of the group. Dryzek may well 
consider these as ideal criteria for understanding, but it is by no means clear that they are 
required as such. His criteria ultimately seem not so much directed towards intersubjective 
understanding, as to ensure the ideal conditions for rational deliberation. While these criteria 
might serve as guidelines for securing common ground between disparate groups in society, 
presenting them as criteria for intersubjective understanding seems to be an overstatement, at 
least from an agonistic perspective.       
 Based on our discussion of Dryzek’s criticism of Mouffe, we have to conclude that his 
critique is wanting. By misrepresenting the central tenets of agonistic pluralism as well as being 
unclear about his deliberative democratic alternative, his argument does not dispel 
emancipatory agonistic pluralism’s reservations about deliberative democratic theory. 
Moreover, after reading ‘Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies’, we still do not know 
whether deliberative democracy can process the kind of deep political difference Mouffe is 
concerned about.14 In the following section we will therefore turn to Andrew Knops. He 
                                                          
14 This is a delicate question for Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism too. While conceptually speaking her agonistic 
pluralism may be able to account for deep difference, it is not clear how it can institutionally. Mouffe does not 
say much about the way in which her agonistic concepts translate into an institutional framework for liberal 
democracy. See footnote 21.  
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believes that Mouffe makes unwarranted claims and that her agonistic pluralism can be 
subsumed under deliberative democratic theory. 
 
2.3  DELIBERATIVE AGONISTIC PLURALISM? ANDREW KNOPS 
Like Erman and Dryzek, Knops criticizes Mouffe head-on. In his article ‘Debate: Agonism as 
Deliberation – On Mouffe’s Theory of Democracy’ he argues that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism 
is not at all at odds with deliberative democratic theory. Before delving into the reasons why, 
he first wants to make a general point about Mouffe’s notion of ‘the political’. According to 
Knops, Mouffe’s universal characterization of ‘the political’ is a universal claim, which she 
moreover defends “by giving reasons” (Knops 2007: 115). Knops maintains that this shows that 
Mouffe actually does believe that it is possible “to establish such a universal model of politics 
through rational argument” (116). Since this is precisely what she criticizes deliberative 
democrats for, she would hereby undermine her own critique: Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, 
just like deliberative democracy, seeks “rational acceptance” (116). After having made this 
preliminary point, Knops arrives at the heart of his critique, which is centred on consensus. Like 
Erman, he wants to show that agonistic pluralism relies on consensus. He will pursue however 
a different path in trying to prove so. Knops hones in on the requirements of agonists concerning 
the ethico-political principles they have to subscribe to. Following Knops, the kind of consensus 
Mouffe requires is not only vague, but favours a deliberative democratic kind of deliberation 
(117).             
 Since Mouffe does not endorse some extreme pluralism but requires the ethico-political 
principles to warrant “respect for belief and opposition to subordination”, Knops believes she 
implicitly endorses an “open fair exchange of reasons between equals”, which is precisely what 
deliberative democrats stand for (117). Moreover, if Mouffe is looking for a consensus that is 
not exclusionary in any sense, he finds it difficult to see how this could be established without 
32 
 
a rational discussion (117). This last point is of crucial importance to Knops’s argument. If 
Mouffe’s democratic theory requires the possibility of a rational consensus “on the substance 
or outputs” of democratic exchange, then agonistic pluralism is not substantially different from 
deliberative democracy and a rational consensus would then be just as much part of agonistic 
pluralism as it is of deliberative democracy (117). He accordingly concludes that “Mouffe’s 
own agonistic alternative to deliberative democracy, designed to counter the impossibility of 
rational consensus, is itself reliant on that very notion” (118). After having thus established that 
a rational consensus underlies Mouffe’s consensus on the ethico-politico principles, he also 
wants to show that Mouffe’s critique does not prove a rational consensus to be conceptually 
impossible (118). He will do so by scrutinizing Mouffe’s discussion of Wittgenstein and 
Derrida.          
 Regarding Wittgenstein, Knops argues that “Habermas sees ‘normal’ language use as 
taking place against a backdrop of conventionally shared meanings or understandings” and that 
it is “only when this assumption breaks down, when the response differs from what was 
expected, that deliberation is required” (Knops 2007: 122). According to Knops, “[t]he process 
that Habermas calls ‘deliberation’ and Wittgenstein calls ‘explanation’”, would therefore be 
basically the same (122). With reference to Tully, Knops qualifies Wittgenstein’s concept of 
language as “inherently dialogical” (122). His description of what according to a 
Wittgensteinian theory of language would happen when two interlocutors have a different view 
of the use of language is as follows: 
This leads to the use of a word eliciting a response that was not expected – a 
rejection. The rejection requires the reappraisal and refinement of our 
understanding of the word, based on the new information given to us about it by 
the unexpected reaction. Based on this adjusted understanding we use word again 
to try to achieve our goal. Through this process of trial and error we build up a 
shared vocabulary, restoring the assumption that we use these words in the same 
way, and in the process we understand the other’s form of life that gave rise to 
their unexpected use. The very process of developing that understanding is the 
process of deliberation. Indeed, in this sense deliberation – explanation or the 
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clarification of usage across different forms of life – can itself be seen as the 
process of development of language use (122). 
 
Knops adds that our development of a shared understanding will always be partial in this way, 
that it may always be fallible. Nevertheless, “the process of explanation, or understanding 
through deliberation” makes it possible for us to understand each other in language, which can 
be seen as “an understanding developed through reason, though partial, fallible and grounded 
in practice” (123). He accordingly concludes that deliberative democracy and a Wittgensteinian 
theory of language are compatible with one another and reprimands Mouffe for making two 
errors that made her think that it is not. First, Mouffe mistakenly assumes that “because 
language is ultimately grounded in practice, rather than reason, it cannot be used to reach a 
rational consensus” (123). Knops however argues that, when understanding deliberative 
theories as “mobilising a form of rationality aimed at intersubjective explanation and mutual 
understanding, we can see that the two accounts are perfectly compatible” (123). Second, 
Mouffe would be wrong to think that the whole variety of language games “rule out any 
possibility of reasoned communication” (123). Following Knops, we need to understand that 
“Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘forms of life’ refers to regularities in practice that underpin 
language. While these do not take the form of prescriptive rules, they can still be discovered 
through language and the process of explanation” (123). In other words, if Knops is right, 
instead of being at odds with it, deliberation is an integral part of Wittgenstein’s theory of 
language.          
 Furthermore, Knops believes that Derrida’s constitutive other does not preclude the 
possibility of rational consensus either. Based on his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
‘explanation’ as ‘deliberation’, he believes there is, conceptually speaking, no reason to 
presume that a rational consensus could be attained; the only way to find out is through 
argument (124). Moreover, Knops stresses that it is precisely through the process of deliberation 
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that we become more aware of difference: “[w]ithout this attempt, we may never become aware 
of these different forms of meaning, or their associated forms of life” (124). In addition, he 
highlights the fact that deliberative democracy is very much aware of the fallible nature of the 
rationally reached consensus, which leaves it “open to question” (124). According to Knops, 
this safeguards deliberative democracy’s rational consensus against Mouffe’s charge of 
hegemony. 
 
2.32 AGONISTIC RESPONSE 
As we have seen above, Knops’s critique revolves around the notion of rational consensus. By 
demonstrating that Mouffe’s portrayal of the political and her ethico-political principles require 
such a consensus, he claims to have refuted agonistic pluralism’s critique of deliberative 
democracy and to have shown that “the two processes of deliberative and agonistic democracy 
– one grounded in critical theory and the other in postmodernism, are in fact mutually dependent 
aspects of a solution to the same problem” (125). As Knops himself does too, I will discuss his 
analysis of ‘the political’ and the consensus on ethico-political principles separately. Regarding 
the former, he maintains that Mouffe gives reasons for this universal claim and thus implicitly 
believes it is possible to establish her theory through rational argument. Interestingly enough 
though, Mouffe actually gives very few reasons to accept her dimension of ‘the political’, if 
any at all. She simply says that deliberative democracy cannot properly understand democracy’s 
predicament as it has neglected it. The same goes for the concomitant antagonism/agonism 
distinction: Mouffe gives very few ‘rational’15 reasons to accept this distinction. Although her 
critique of deliberative democratic theory’s rationality paves the way for accepting her 
conceptual framework, it does not amount to a fully developed argument for her conceptual 
                                                          
15 In a deliberative democratic sense as presented in this thesis. 
35 
 
distinctions by itself. Thus she does not try to convince us of her fundamental values through 
conventional rational argument, but makes a more radical attempt to change our perspective on 
liberal democracy as a whole. By showing that the rationalistic framework of deliberative 
democratic theory cannot account for democracy’s challenges, Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism 
purportedly offers us a better understanding of the nature of these challenges. Instead of proving 
that Mouffe thinks that the fundamental values of her political framework can be grounded in 
rational argument, her discussion of ‘the political’ conversely seems to show that she indeed 
thinks this is not possible. Having thus discredited Knops’s criticism of Mouffe’s notion of ‘the 
political’, I will turn to his critique on the consensus on the ethico-political principles of liberal 
democracy.          
 Knops rightly points out that Mouffe requires substantive commitments from agonists 
besides their commitment to the ethico-political principles of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’. The 
requirement of consensus on the ethico-political principles so that relations of subordination 
and domination can be challenged is however a sine qua non of antagonism-turned-agonism 
(Mouffe 2000: 20). What sets the agonistic relation apart from the antagonistic one is precisely 
this respect for the other as someone who subscribes to the same political principles. Relations 
of subordination or domination should be abolished as much as possible within an agonistic 
framework, lest it collapses into antagonism again, which, according to Mouffe, is always 
present anyway as ‘the political’. Conversely, although she does not make this very explicit, 
this also implies that those who do not subscribe to these principles can legitimately be 
considered enemies. Thus, when Mouffe writes that agonists have respect for each other’s 
beliefs and the right to defend them, this does not mean that any kind of belief is defendable 
whatsoever. Only the beliefs that fit in with the ethico-political principles of liberty and equality 
merit agonistic respect. The kind of consensus needed is therefore not rational per se, not based 
on an “open fair exchange of reasons between equals” (Knops 2007: 117). According to 
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Mouffe, subscribing to the political values of liberty and equality is ultimately a matter of 
identification and conviction.         
 What may have led Knops to think that a rational consensus is inescapable for Mouffe’s 
political project, is his assertion that Mouffe is trying to ground a consensus that is “not […] 
biased against a particular group in society” (117). He conflates two different kinds of 
consensus here, however: the agreement on the ethico-political principles of liberty and equality 
and the hegemonic consensus on their respective conceptions. Knops seems to believe that 
Mouffe wants to make sure that this backdrop agreement between antagonists does not exclude 
anyone, but at that point exclusion constitutes for Mouffe the very possibility of (consensual) 
inclusion. Exclusion becomes a pressing issue for Mouffe only after this first agreement on the 
ethico-political principles of liberal democracy. She accordingly defines the ensuing agonistic 
consensus as ‘conflictual’: “[the] ethico-political principles can only exist through many 
different and conflicting interpretations […]” (103). Mouffe adds to this that agonistic 
confrontation is “ideally staged around the diverse conceptions of citizenship which correspond 
to the different interpretations of the ethico-political principles: liberal-conservative, social-
democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, and so on” (104). Knops’s criticism falls flat if 
rational consensus is not a prerequisite for consensus on the ethico-political principles, which, 
as I have argued, is not the case.       
 While his critique on Mouffe’s notion of consensus thus does not succeed, nor does his 
Wittgensteinian defence of deliberative democratic theory. Knops’s assertion that deliberation 
is only required when ‘normal’ understanding breaks down seems to radically undermine the 
whole raison d’être of deliberative democratic theory, lest Knops think that we would all have 
the same ideas if we would just properly understand each other. In addition, it seems highly 
doubtful whether Wittgenstein would agree that giving an explanation (or ‘deliberation’, in 
Knops’s words) would suffice for creating a shared vocabulary and understanding each other’s 
37 
 
form of life.16 It seems that Knops does not sufficiently heed Wittgenstein’s assertion here that 
agreement in opinion or judgement precedes agreement in language, which his Wittgensteinian 
account of deliberative democratic theory does not account for. His two criticisms of Mouffe’s 
interpretation of Wittgenstein are equally flawed. First, Mouffe specifically criticizes a 
universalist rational consensus, which from a Wittgensteinian perspective would indeed be 
problematic. Unless there would only be a single form of life, ‘rationality’ will likely have many 
different meanings, depending on the form of life. While a universal rational consensus may 
theoretically not be wholly excluded, it is highly unlikely from a Wittgensteinian perspective, 
given rationality’s dependence on practice and context. Second, Knops’s claim that it would be 
possible from a Wittgensteinian perspective to discover forms of life through explanation is 
dubious. Again, if understanding a practice underlies understanding, it is questionable whether 
we can truly understand one another just through language. Language may help, but is not 
enough by itself. Given that Knops’s Wittgensteinian defence of deliberation proves to be 
flawed, his critique of Mouffe’s use of Derrida’s concept of the ‘constitutive other’ fails too. If 
deliberation alone cannot bridge the gap between different forms of life, a deliberatively 
reached rational consensus cannot be guaranteed to respect ‘difference’, as it would not be fully 
able to recognize it.  
 
2.4  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have analysed and evaluated Erman, Dryzek and Knops’s critiques of Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism. Though offering varying critiques, we have seen that they all hold that 
                                                          
16 In “Wittgenstein and the Utility of Disagreement” (2016), Pearson notes the difficulty of defining 
Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘understanding’ as developed in Philosophical Investigations. He however maintains 
that it could at least be minimally defined as “the state of being able, or the process of coming to be able, to 
legitimately say “now I can go on.” This means being able to employ and engage with the rules involved in a 
particular practice” (4).  
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deliberative democratic theory has a reply to agonistic pluralism’s objections. In order to show 
this to be the case, they critiqued the underlying conceptual premises of agonistic pluralism and 
offered an interpretation of deliberative democratic theory that is kinder to agonistic pluralism’s 
preoccupations. These two argumentative strategies are interlinked: if agonistic pluralism’s 
conceptual premises are flawed, it cannot be considered a viable alternative to deliberative 
democratic theory. Deliberative democrats might still have to make some changes to their 
deliberative framework, but that would then settle the debate. We have seen, however, that the 
deliberative democratic critique of agonistic pluralism’s conceptual premises does not wholly 
succeed and that Erman, Dryzek and Knops accordingly have not shown that Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism can be subsumed under deliberative democratic theory.    
 While Erman is right to point out that the antagonistic relationship requires a common 
symbolic framework, this does not prove that it requires a deliberative kind of consensus. 
Instead of deliberation, Mouffe points to identification: she believes people ultimately become 
liberal democrats through conversion, not argument. Regarding Dryzek, we have seen that he 
misunderstands some of the central tenets of agonistic pluralism. Mouffe, for example, does not 
scorn consensus for power, nor believes identities to be fixed. Moreover, while Dryzek 
maintains that his deliberative democratic theory can process ‘deep difference’, he does not 
make clear how it can. Dryzek needs to be more specific regarding his competent actors and 
specify in what way the three conditions for intersubjective understanding are precisely 
fundamental to successful communication. Concerning Knops, we have seen how he conflates 
the agreement between antagonists on the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy and 
the conflictual consensus of agonists over their conception. While the agreement between 
antagonists is necessarily based on exclusion, Mouffe requires the consensus between agonists 
to be as inclusive as possible (yet still necessarily exclusive). Exclusion and subordination only 
become problematic on the agonistic level, not the antagonistic one. Moreover, his 
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Wittgensteinian defence of deliberative democratic theory proved to be flawed, just as his 
appropriation of Derrida’s ‘constitutive other’.     
 Although the deliberative democratic critique offered by Erman, Dryzek and Knops thus 
does not fully deliver on its promise, it does point out two major themes that have been 
underdeveloped within Mouffe’s conceptual framework. First, there is the question of how 
antagonists come to accept the same ethico-political principles. If this is based on passionate 
identification with those principles, what is the nature of this passionate identification exactly? 
Or does Mouffe simply accept these principles as a given and is her conceptual framework only 
valid for places that have already embraced her ethico-political principles of liberal democracy? 
These questions touch upon one of Mouffe’s most important conceptual distinctions, that of 
antagonists and agonists. Without a clear account of democratic identification, it is hard to 
envisage how antagonists come to embrace the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy. 
Second, there is the question of the nature of Mouffe’s pluralism. Although she writes that any 
political consensus will contain traces of violence and subordination, she holds, at the same 
time, that her agonistic pluralism is born out of the wish to combat these political wrongdoings. 
Does Mouffe differentiate between the relative merits of different hegemonic powers? If so, 
can she then still defend the idea that the conception of the concepts of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ 
are up for grabs within an agonistic power struggle, or is the range of political plurality she 
actually endorses much more limited than she likes to portray? 
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CHAPTER 3 
IDENTITIFICATION AND EMANCIPATION 
After having established the strengths and the weaknesses of the deliberative democratic 
critique on Mouffe in the last chapter, there are still two major challenges that Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism from a deliberative democratic perspective needs to address. First, Mouffe 
does not elaborate enough on the way in which antagonists become agonists, which does seem 
to be of major relevance for agonistic pluralism to be considered a viable alternative to 
deliberative democratic theory. Her agonistic pluralism appears to be confined to political 
entities that have already embraced liberal democracy, hence greatly limiting the scope of her 
political project. I will try to expand Mouffe’s notion of identification by linking it to an article 
by Aletta Norval called ‘Democratic Identification: A Wittgensteinian Approach’. Both Mouffe 
and Norval draw on Wittgenstein for their respective analysis of democratic identification. 
However, whereas Mouffe mainly employs Wittgenstein’s philosophy to attack the deliberative 
democrat’s notion of rationality, Norval draws on Wittgenstein’s notions of ‘aspect dawning’ 
and ‘continuous aspect perception’ in order to explain how a democratic political grammar 
comes about. I believe Norval’s political interpretation of these Wittgensteinian notions can 
help us understand how antagonists become agonists within Mouffe’s political framework.
 Second, there is the question of Mouffe’s substantive commitments. She presents her 
theory as a pluralist alternative to deliberative democratic theory, but at the same time delimits 
the democratic playing field by demanding that all agonists adhere to the ethico-political 
principles of freedom and equality for all. This raises questions concerning the political agenda 
informing her political theory. By discussing two different articles by Acampora and Fossen, 
we will elucidate the values underpinning Mouffe’s pluralism. The central question of this 
chapter is as follows: is Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism conceptually coherent?  
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3.1  IDENTIFYING AS A LIBERAL DEMOCRAT 
The 1995 article ‘Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity’ is one of Mouffe’s clearest 
works on political identification. According to Mouffe, the main difficulty concerning 
democratic politics from the viewpoint of political identity is “[h]ow to conceptualize our 
identities as individuals and as citizens in a way that does not sacrifice one to the other” (Mouffe 
1995: 34). She makes explicit that her treatment of this question should be located within a 
modern democratic political framework, which “postulates certain ethicopolitical principles 
that constitute its principles of legitimacy: liberty and equality for all” (41). Since the legitimacy 
of the liberal democratic state rests on its adherence to these principles, our political identity 
overrides our other identities (41). This leads Mouffe to the conclusion that “we need a 
conception of citizenship as political identity that consists of the identification with the political 
principles of modern democracy and commitment to defend its key institutions” (41). She does 
not explain how this identification comes about in the first place; Mouffe just wants to argue 
that we can only understand modern liberal democracy properly, if we think of citizenship in 
terms of identification with the political principles of liberal democracy. This seems to be a real 
weakness in her political theory, however. While her political framework rests on the 
transformation from antagonism into agonism, she does not properly argue how antagonists 
come to accept the same ethico-political principles. In the last chapter, we saw how Erman 
criticizes her on this point, by branding the change from antagonist to agonist “a moral choice 
that can be neither explained nor grounded” (Erman 2009: 1049).     
 In ‘Democratic Identification: A Wittgensteinian Approach’, Aletta Norval offers an 
analysis of democratic identification that supplements Mouffe’s discussion of democratic 
identification very well and in ways Norval herself does not make explicit. Like Mouffe, Norval 
makes use of Wittgenstein’s language philosophy. She does not do so to criticize value-neutral 
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rationality, however, but to show how we should understand democratic identification. Norval 
points out that “[t]he absence of an account of the moments in which we assume democratic 
subjectivity in deliberative and post-structuralist conceptions of democracy leaves us unable to 
think through how it is that we become democrats and make democratic subjectivity ours” 
(Norval 2006: 230). In order to understand how the democratic subject comes about and what 
practices are needed to sustain democratic identification, Norval believes that we should 
consider the role of ‘political grammars’, “those horizons delimiting what is possible in any 
given context” (231). A political grammar dictates “what may count as possible descriptions of 
how things are” (231). Within this context, Norval gives the example of ‘liberty’. Liberty could 
be defined as a human-growth theory or an unlimited self-determination theory for example. 
Within the former a concept like ‘equality of opportunity’ will take centre stage, whereas in the 
latter principles of non-interference will be prevailing (232). Norval contends that we get a 
better understanding of the way in which political grammars change if we consider the 
Wittgensteinian concepts of ‘aspect dawning’ and ‘continuous aspect perception’. 
 ‘Continuous aspect perception’ denotes the way in which we usually think of the world, 
“where words are used as a simple perceptual report” (235). It refers to mental pictures of the 
world that have become so natural to us that we do not recognize them as mental pictures any 
longer. If we have always thought of ‘liberty’ as being about human-growth for example, it 
might have never occurred to us that liberty could also be thought of as an unlimited self-
determination theory. Norval writes that “[p]olitically, this is analogous to a situation of 
hegemony in which we just treat matter in a certain way, where we do not weigh up different 
alternatives and interpret our practices but simply take them for granted” (235). ‘Aspect 
dawning’, on the other hand, indicates the moment “when one realizes that a new kind of 
characterization of an object or situation may be given, and we see it in those terms […]” (235). 
Norval thinks aspect dawning is especially pertinent to the way political grammars change as it 
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explains how new political grammars come about, while at the same time highlighting the 
continuity between them. Aspect dawning does not suggest radical change between political 
grammars, but “is closely connected to providing a surview, that is to say, by putting objects, 
words, or rules in relation to other objects, words, or rules, they are situated in a different context 
in which sense is made of them” (236). According to Norval, the dynamics between continuous 
aspect perception and aspect dawning give a much better account of political subjectivity than 
historicist or voluntarist accounts, by highlighting the interplay between continuity and 
discontinuity: “[t]hings simply are no longer the same; our way of looking at things has 
changed. But […] this is not a break that denies all that has gone before. To the contrary, it is 
dependent upon what has gone before, but that before is also rearranged – resignified – in 
important respects” (238).         
 Having thus set the conceptual framework for understanding changes in political 
grammars, Norval brings up two points that are of particular interest to our discussion of 
Mouffe’s antagonism/agonism distinction. First of all, she maintains that becoming a 
democratic subject entails being gripped by a certain picture, an ‘identification-as’. Against 
deliberative democratic theory, Norval believes this ‘identification-as’ “is the embodied act of 
a subject passionately involved in an activity that structures her political life and participation 
in a certain way” (241). This quote could have been easily from Mouffe, who puts the passions 
and identification at the forefront of her political theory, too. In her chapter on Wittgenstein in 
The Democratic Paradox, she writes for example that “[t]he creation of democratic forms of 
individuality is a question of identification with democratic values, and this is a complex 
process that takes place through a manifold of practices, discourses and language-games” 
(Mouffe 2000: 70). According to Mouffe, “democracy does not require a theory of truth and 
notions like unconditionality and universal validity but a manifold of practices and pragmatic 
moves aiming at persuading people to broaden the range of their commitments to others […]” 
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(65, 66). While she underscores the importance of identification and democratic practices for 
democracy, Mouffe does not offer many pointers to understand how a democratic grammar 
comes about. It is here that Norval’s political appropriation of Wittgensteinian aspect dawning 
comes in. Aspect dawning not only implies describing pictures anew, but also seeing pictures 
as pictures. Politically speaking, this translates to the idea that “being aware of a political 
grammar as a grammar is indicative of an awareness of multiplicity, and recognizing that things 
can never be quite the same again” (Norval 2006: 242). Norval believes that this awareness of 
multiplicity could foster a more open political community (242). This is precisely what Mouffe 
expects of the transition from antagonism into agonism: by acknowledging the legitimacy of 
other political views and being able to relativize their own, antagonists become able to agree 
on the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy. While both Mouffe and Norval stress 
the importance of practices for democratic identification, Norval makes us understand how 
these practices induce aspect change and the development of a democratic grammar. The 
concept of aspect dawning offers a theoretical scaffolding as to how democratic practices might 
contribute in creating the conditions in which antagonists come to embrace the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy and hence turn into agonists.17 Yet, as both Norval and Mouffe 
attest, citizens do not become democrats once and for all. Aspect dawning in the form of 
participation within democratic practices is constantly needed in order to steer the passionate 
‘identification-as’ towards democratic political grammars (248).    
 I believe Norval’s discussion of political grammars in terms of aspect dawning and 
aspect change fills in a conceptual lacunae in Mouffe’s antagonism/agonism discussion. 
                                                          
17As an illustration of such a democratizing practice, Norval describes her experience of standing in line to vote 
in South-Africa after apartheid: “[T]he atmosphere at polling stations was nothing short of festive. There was no 
shortage of radios and cassette players providing music and stalls selling refreshments, contributing to the festive 
atmosphere. Most notable of all, though, was the interaction between those queuing. Both black and white, living 
and working in what were the highly unequal conditions of the “white” suburbs, engaged in conversation and 
shared an experience of enormous significance – as equal participants. This participation signalled the public 
assumption of democratic subjectivity” (Norval 2006: 229, 230). 
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Whereas Mouffe does not offer a satisfying answer to the question how antagonists come to 
embrace the same ethico-political principles except for alluding to the necessity of the 
friend/enemy distinction and passionate democratic identification, Norval offers us a 
conceptual model in order to explain how this democratic identification could possibly lead to 
the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy. Participation in democratic practices may 
induce aspect change, which in turn can change the political grammar. By learning to relativize 
one’s own political position and acknowledging the legitimacy of that of others, the way is 
paved for antagonistic support for the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy, i.e. 
freedom and equality. 
 
3.2  EMANCIPATORY AGONISTIC PLURALISM 
While Norval thus offers a conceptual framework to buttress Mouffe’s antagonism/agonism 
distinction, Mouffe’s substantive commitments regarding pluralism in a modern liberal society 
might prove more challenging to be rendered coherent. On the one hand, Mouffe criticizes 
deliberative democratic theory for implicitly and unwarrantedly compromising political 
pluralism. On the other, Mouffe seems to be more rigid than deliberative democrats as to what 
beliefs are permissible within a liberal democracy. Agonists are distinguished from antagonists 
by their adherence to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy, seemingly implying 
as well that all who do not adhere to these principles can be said to be legitimate enemies. For 
a political theory that originated as an answer to the pluralist shortcomings of deliberative 
democratic theory, this appears to be at least somewhat contradictory. In order to shine light on 
the nature of Mouffe’s pluralism, I will first discuss an article by Acampora called ‘Demos 
Agonistes Redux’, in which she gives a Nietzschean critique of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism. 
Acampora argues that if Mouffe were truly committed to agonism and democracy, she would 
have to admit that even the ethico-political principles underlying a political community should 
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be at stake in the agonistic struggle. Why she does not want to do this becomes clear in Fossen’s 
article ‘Agonistic Critiques of Liberalism: Perfection and Emancipation’, in which he brands 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism ‘emancipatory’. According to Fossen, Mouffe values pluralism as 
it promulgates ‘difference’ and the possibility for contestation against harm and injustice. I will 
conclude by discussing to what extent Acampora and Fossen’s critiques compromise Mouffe’s 
political framework.          
 In ‘Demos Agonistes Redux’, Acampora gives a Nietzschean analysis of the ethico-
political principles of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism. Although staying true to the original 
Nietzschean concept does not seem to be one of Mouffe’s main worries, Acampora argues that 
even if Mouffe entertains her own notion of agonism, she runs into a Nietzschean critique 
regarding the nature of democracy. The most pregnant question Acampora puts forward is why 
the desirability of democratic values should be immune to critique, as is the case with Mouffe’s 
ethico-political principles (Acampora 2003: 384). We have seen before that adherence to the 
ethico-political principles of liberty and equality is a prerequisite for all agonists within 
Mouffe’s political framework. Besides pointing out that this leads to undemocratic exclusion, 
Acampora underscores that these principles delimit what the agonistic struggle can be about as 
well, i.e. liberty and equality: “Mouffe’s adversaries will differ only in terms of the content they 
give to those liberal democratic principles […] and hence the point of the contest will always 
and only be to give meaning to those two values” (385). Damningly for Mouffe, Acampora 
believes this implies that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism does not substantially differ from the 
political frameworks offered by Rawls and Habermas. Just like Rawls and Habermas, Mouffe’s 
political theory retains a fixed hierarchy of values, simply substituting reason for liberty and 
equality (385).           
 What Acampora brings to the fore is that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism is confined by 
her undemocratically chosen ethico-political principles. Both the undemocratic distinction 
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between antagonists and agonists on the basis of their adherence to the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy and the untouchable character of these principles compromise 
the plurality of agonistic positions. They show that there is a clear substantive aspect to 
Mouffe’s agonistic project, which Fossen brands ‘emancipatory’.18 Although at a first glance it 
might seem that Mouffe valuates pluralism by itself, Fossen maintains that this commitment to 
pluralism “is insufficient to explain a commitment to contestatory politics” (Fossen 2008: 2). 
He argues that “the agonistic concern with pluralism cannot be understood in abstraction from 
underlying normative and theoretical commitments” (3). Fossen points out that Mouffe’s 
normative and theoretical commitments revolve around ‘difference’, on three different 
conceptual levels: that of “the constitutive principles of liberal democracy, disagreement and 
public reason, and identity” (10). The irresolvable tension between the liberal and democratic 
traditions of liberal democracy, the impossibility of ‘objective’ rationality and the ‘constitutive 
outside’ fundamental to identity formation can all be articulated in terms of ‘difference’. He 
argues that for agonistic pluralists, it is this difference that is at stake within deliberative 
democratic theory. By depoliticizing pluralism, deliberative democrats would violate against 
difference and hence pluralism. Pace Fossen, Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism accordingly has “an 
emancipatory ideal at its core” (12). He goes on to specify what he means by emancipatory: 
[e]mancipation should be conceived broadly here: not simply as a call to establish (socio-
economic) equality among individuals or groups, but as a permanent attempt to lay bare and 
redress the harm and injustice caused by violence and exclusion, by restrictions of pluralism” 
                                                          
18 Fossen argues that we should make a distinction between ‘emancipatory’ agonism on the one hand 
(represented by Mouffe and Honig) and ‘perfectionist’ (represented by Owen) on the other. While emancipatory 
agonistic pluralism is best understood as a critique of liberalism, perfectionist agonism “values agonism not for 
its capacity to challenge violence and exclusion, but for its capacity to enhance citizens’ virtues and capacities – 
for its Bildung of better citizens” (Fossen 2008: 10, 16). According to Fossen, perfectionist agonism is the more 
radical of the two, as it poses an external challenge to liberal political theory. Instead of criticizing liberalism for 
its harms and injustices, as emancipatory agonists do, perfectionist agonists like Owen question its ends: 
“[s]hould we affirm the cultivation of excellence as an aim of politics? And to what extent does liberalism 
undermine the cultural resources for this?” (20). See Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity: a Critique of 
Liberal Reason (1995).  
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(13). Pluralism is valued inasmuch as it gives room to difference and contestation, precisely the 
opposite of the deliberative democratic search for consensus-enhancing conditions. 
 Based on Acampora’s and Fossen’s critiques, we can ask ourselves whether Mouffe’s 
brand of agonistic pluralism is more pluralist than deliberative democratic theory. By delimiting 
the ethico-political principles agonists have to abide by and through its insistence on difference 
and contestation, the ideal agonistic pluralist seems to be a (radical) leftist. This is not 
remarkable, giving Mouffe’s endorsement of leftist views in earlier works.19 It does raise the 
question whether her agonistic pluralism offers a more pluralist conception of a democratic 
society than deliberative democracy does, as it now seems that the hegemonic power that leaves 
the most room for contestation and differences should be seen as the preferred one. Is not the 
kind of pluralism she defends then just as much compromised by the requirement of supporting 
difference within the boundaries of ‘liberty and equality for all’ as the political pluralism 
dominated by reason of Rawls and Habermas? In defence of Mouffe can be said that this is 
precisely the reason for her distinction between antagonism and agonism. For Mouffe, liberal 
democracy presupposes agreement on some core values, which she considers to be the ethico-
political principles of liberty and equality. Agreeing on liberty and equality for all, however, 
implies for Mouffe that we commit ourselves to difference and the possibility for contestation. 
In other words, difference and contestation are written into liberal democracy’s DNA. What 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism then tries to do is to tap into the potential for difference and 
contestation at the heart of liberal democracy. While Rawls and Habermas seem to want to lead 
liberal democracy to its supposed consensual optimum, Mouffe highlights that its greatest merit 
lies in its potential for agonistic conflict. 
 
                                                          
19 See for example Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), co-authored by Ernesto Laclau. 
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3.3  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have addressed two pressing issues concerning the coherence of Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism. First, I have argued that Norval’s Wittgensteinian inspired discussion of 
‘aspect dawning’ and ‘continuous aspect perception’ regarding changes in political grammar is 
an important supplement to Mouffe’s own discussion of democratic identification. Norval’s 
account is more comprehensive than Mouffe’s and refutes Erman’s criticism that agonistic 
pluralism cannot account for the transition from antagonism to agonism. Norval’s conceptual 
framework aligns itself well with Mouffe’s critique of deliberative democratic theory that it 
puts too much emphasis on deliberation regarding democratic subject formation, which instead 
should be thought of in terms of practice and identification. Having thus cushioned Mouffe’s 
move from antagonism to liberal democratic agonism, I have discussed the more contentious 
issue of the nature of Mouffe’s pluralism. Following Acampora’s analysis, we saw that Mouffe 
does not think agonism all the way through. She lays bare that Mouffe is more committed to 
political pluralism than agonism. In addition, Fossen showed that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism 
is based on difference and contestation, for which he calls it ‘emancipatory’.   
 It may seem that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism would therefore be incoherent; if she 
endorses pluralism because of other values, it seems to follow that she only endorses kinds of 
agonism that are in support of those values. Following Acampora’s critique, Mouffe would 
restrict liberal democratic pluralism just as much as Rawls and Habermas, only on the basis of 
a different hierarchy of values. Moreover, if her branch of agonistic pluralism contains  political 
commitments to difference and contestation, as Fossen argues, Mouffe’s pluralism is not only 
restricted on the antagonistic level of the ethico-political principles, but as well on the agonistic 
level of their conception. I contend, however, that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism is not decisively 
undermined by these dissections. Regarding Acampora’s critique, I would like to emphasize 
that Mouffe believes that all agonistic hegemonies are already committed to liberty and equality 
50 
 
for all through their adherence to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy. Since 
liberalism and democracy and their concomitant values of liberty and equality constitute for 
Mouffe the conceptual framework of liberal democracy, it simply cannot do without. 
Furthermore, Mouffe does not want to challenge liberal democracy per se. Her agonistic 
pluralism is directed against deliberative democratic theory’s attempt to reconcile liberalism 
and democracy with each other in the form of a rational consensus. Instead, Mouffe maintains 
we should acknowledge the ineradicable tension between liberalism and democracy in order to 
appreciate its strength, which lies in its ability to challenge “relations of inclusion-exclusion” 
and its “logics of equivalence” (Mouffe 2000: 10). In order to preserve liberal democracy’s 
valuable but fragile equilibrium, agonistic debate over the values that make liberal democracy 
possible at all is excluded.         
 Mouffe’s commitment to difference and fighting relations of subordination moreover 
need not compromise her commitment to agonistic pluralism. We have seen before that she 
holds that any hegemonic power within a liberal democracy can be challenged for the way it 
interprets the ethico-political principles of liberty and equality for all. Mouffe might think that 
a (radical) leftist hegemony fighting subordination would offer the fullest expression of these 
principles, but as long as she does not deny that even such a hegemony could be contested, this 
does not undermine her commitment to agonistic pluralism. Both her antagonism/agonism 
distinction and her pluralism-delimiting commitment to the ethico-political principles of liberal 
democracy thus, ultimately, do not pose insurmountable challenges to the conceptual coherence 
of her agonistic pluralism. 
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CONCLUSION 
Can agonistic pluralism better accommodate political pluralism than deliberative democratic 
theory? 
In order to formulate an answer to the central question of this thesis, we have had to traverse a 
diverse landscape of deliberative democratic and agonistic pluralist arguments. In the first 
chapter, we saw how Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism critiques some of the central tenets of 
deliberative democratic theory. By carefully scrutinizing Mouffe’s critique, we noticed how the 
most fundamental disagreements between Mouffe and her deliberative democratic opponents 
revolve around ‘the political’. While ‘the political’ constitutes for Mouffe the key to 
understanding the liberal democratic predicament, Habermas believes that political power 
always requires democratic legitimacy through rational argument. Their respective views on 
‘the political’ have important implications for the way they conceive of political pluralism. 
While for Mouffe antagonistic disagreement (under the guise of ‘the political’) is an 
ineradicable aspect of liberal democracy, Habermas believes political differences can be 
overcome by rational argument. As I stated at the end of the first chapter, it would seem as if 
we are in a deadlock; since Mouffe predominantly gives consequentialist answers to the reason 
why we should accept ‘the political’ (as it helps us understand the predicament of modern 
democracy), deliberative democrats might easily reject them for not abiding by their standards 
for rational argument. Yet, we have seen how Erman, Dryzek and Knops take up Mouffe’s 
agonistic challenge by criticizing agonistic pluralism’s key concepts and showing how 
deliberative democratic theory withstands her critique.     
 Through our analysis of their respective critiques, we concluded that they fail in 
definitively subsuming agonistic pluralism under a deliberative democratic banner. An 
especially thorny point proved to be Mouffe’s notion of consensus. As she attacks the idea of a 
rational consensus vehemently, it seems as if she were against any consensus whatsoever. Yet, 
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as we have discussed, Mouffe does not deny the need for consensus, quite the contrary. For 
antagonism to turn into agonism, agreement on the ethico-political principles of liberal 
democracy is an absolute requirement. What she criticizes, however, is the deliberative-
democratic notion that a rational consensus ensures political pluralism. Opposed to this view, 
Mouffe argues that such a consensus ignores the dimension of ‘the political’. She believes any 
consensus should be seen as a hegemonic expression of power suppressing ‘difference’ and 
hence pluralism. Moreover, Mouffe maintains that there is no such thing as a rational argument. 
By propagating rationality as the yardstick with which to measure the validity of arguments, 
deliberative democrats would preclude political pluralism, since everything that does not fit 
their deliberative criterion of rationality becomes disqualified as irrational and therefore 
argumentatively invalid. Instead of consensus, liberal democracy would be better served if 
‘difference’ and contestation enter the liberal democratic limelight. Only then would political 
pluralism be a reality.         
 Notwithstanding the fact that the deliberative democratic critique of Mouffe did not 
fully achieve its goal, it did point out two major challenges regarding the coherence of Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism. First, there was the question of the tenability of the antagonism/agonism 
distinction. I have argued that Mouffe makes some confused remarks on this issue, by stating 
that antagonists do not share a common symbolic framework, while agonists do. To save this 
distinction, she would add that she means a common political symbolic framework. Without 
any common symbolic framework whatsoever, agreement on the ethico-political principles of 
liberal democracy would be inconceivable. Moreover, a substantial weakness in Mouffe’s 
theory is that she gives very few pointers as to how antagonists come to accept the ethico-
political principles of liberal democracy. Although she alludes to the friend/enemy distinction 
and the importance of democratic identification through democratic practices, the coming into 
being of such a consensus between antagonists remains an enigma. It is here that Norval’s 
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discussion of ‘aspect seeing’ and ‘aspect perception’ came to help. Fitting in perfectly with 
Mouffe’s own discussion of Wittgenstein, Norval points out that it helps to think of democratic 
identification in terms of ‘aspect change’: when aspect change occurs, one looks both at his 
own political position anew and learns to relativize it. This is precisely what Mouffe requires 
of antagonists. By accepting the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy and 
acknowledging others as legitimate political opponents, their antagonistic disagreement turns 
into an agonistic one. The antagonist-turned-agonist can relativize his own position by 
acknowledging the legitimacy of other political conceptions of freedom and equality, while at 
the same time having the inalienable right to question those conceptions. The concept of aspect 
change thus helps us understand how Mouffe’s democratic identification can change the 
political grammar of communities and opens the possibility for consensus on the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy.        
 Second, there was the question of Mouffe’s substantive commitments. We have seen 
that Mouffe is (undemocratically) committed to a kind of pluralism that Fossen calls 
‘emancipatory’. It appears that Mouffe thinks that the fullest expression of the ethico-political 
principles can be found in a leftist hegemony and that the agonistic struggle will necessarily 
move into that direction, as any political consensus inherently violates and subordinates some 
of its subjects in her view. Since she does not explicitly state that her own preferred hegemonic 
conception of the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy constitutes the fullest 
conception of the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy, this ultimately does not 
compromise the coherence of her agonistic pluralism, however.    
 The answer to the question whether agonistic pluralism can accommodate pluralism 
better than deliberative democratic theory then mostly depends on the question whether we see 
pluralism as constitutive of liberal democracy or as a challenge. If we accept Mouffe’s category 
of the ‘the political’ and her inscription of pluralism at the conceptual level of liberal 
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democracy, we can agree with her that political pluralism is constantly under pressure from 
consensual forces aiming for homogenization. In that case, agonistic pluralism would indeed 
offer a pluralist alternative to deliberative democratic theory. If, however, we do not accept 
Mouffe’s “conception of democratic politics”20, for which she gives few ‘rational’ arguments 
from a deliberative democratic perspective, deliberative democratic theory offers a more 
elaborate political framework for envisaging a well-functioning pluralist society.21 It is 
questionable, however, to what extent deliberative democratic theory’s reliance on impartial or 
intersubjective rationality is tenable. If rationality does not prove to be the solid rock on which 
to build a fully inclusive political consensus, as Mouffe argues through her discussion of 
Wittgenstein, political pluralism is better served with a political theory that openly 
acknowledges that such a consensus is conceptually impossible, like emancipatory agonistic 
pluralism.          
 Whether we think political pluralism is better accommodated within consensual 
deliberative democracy or emancipatory agonistic pluralism, is ultimately decided by our 
convictions on the nature of concepts like ‘rationality’ and ‘the political’. By showing that 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism withstands its deliberative democratic critiques, I have argued that 
her agonistic pluralism should be considered a viable alternative to deliberative democratic 
theory at the very least. There is no neutral criterion, however, to decide which political theory 
is ‘objectively’ better suited to political pluralism and there cannot be one. As Wittgenstein 
                                                          
20 Phrasing by Fossen (2008). 
21 While in this thesis I have largely confined myself to conceptual challenges to Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, 
her political theory has also been questioned on its interpretation of political institutions and collective decision 
making. In Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism and Political Liberalism (2011), 
Wingenbach argues that agonistic pluralism can be best envisaged within the institutional model of political 
liberalism: “[…] The account of institutional structure most likely to both support agonistic engagement and 
preserve the conditions for agonism to flourish while nevertheless generating collectively binding decisions is a 
modified version of Rawls’s political liberalism” (Wingenbach 2011: 12, 13). He argues that “if the architecture 
of political liberalism […] could be severed from the commitment to consensus and order, then an agonistic 
version of liberalism might emerge” (13). If Wingenbach is right, political liberalism’s institutions and Mouffe’s 
agonistic conceptual framework could thus be aligned with one another. Whether this is truly the case has to be 
the topic of another thesis.  
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writes in On Certainty: “At the end of reasons comes persuasion” (Wittgenstein 1984: 243).22 
If I have persuaded the reader within the language game of a master’s thesis that Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism is a conceptually sound political theory for reflecting on the nature of 
political pluralism, I consider this thesis to be a success. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 “Am Ende der Gründe steht die Überredung.” 
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